Accounting mailbox taken over, no alert raised
Microsoft 365 tenant admin-soehne.example · accounting mailbox · monitoring service
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Description
In the agreed phishing exercise, one of twelve volunteer staff signed in on a fake login page and approved the sign-in prompt that followed. The tester then had the accounting mailbox for five days: reading, sending and setting forwarding rules. The monitoring service raised no alert.
Steps to reproduce
- Send the agreed exercise email to the twelve target accounts from the rules of engagement.
- One target signs in on the exercise page and approves the sign-in prompt.
- The tester works in the accounting mailbox for five days; the monitoring service raises no alert.
Exercise emails: 12
Sign-ins on the exercise page: 1
Reported to IT: 2
Access to the accounting mailbox: 5 days
(read, send, forwarding rules)
Alerts from the monitoring service: 0 Business impact
Exactly the setup for CEO and invoice fraud: real invoices, real threads, changed bank details sent from your own accounting address. Five days without an alert show that detection, not just MFA, needs work.
Remediation
Use phishing-resistant sign-in (security keys or passkeys) for finance and management. Alert on new forwarding rules and sign-ins from unknown devices, and test that the monitoring service reacts. Confirm every change of bank details by phone, using a number you already know.
MITRE ATT&CK T1566 (Phishing), T1114.003 (Email Forwarding Rule), T1078 (Valid Accounts) · NIST SP 800-63B (phishing-resistant authenticators)